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Ethnic Externalities and 2nd Generation Immigrants
Firat Yaman1
I analyze the role of regional ethnic capital – defined as the average years of schooling of eth-
nic groups – in the educational attainment of young second generation immigrants in Germany and
whether results are sensitive to regional aggregation. I find evidence for externalities of ethnic cap-
ital for ethnic groups at the regional level. A higher average education of ethnics makes attendance
of higher-quality secondary schools more likely. Moreover, the marginal effect of the externality
is increasing in the ethnic concentration in the region. However, if higher than regional aggregates
are used for the measurement of ethnic capital, no externalities are detected.
JEL classification: I20, J15, R23
Keywords: 2nd generation immigrants, ethnic capital, ethnic concentration
1City University London. This paper was written as part of the Marie Curie Research Training Network on
‘Transnationality of Migrants’ TOM, which is funded by the European Commission through the Human Resources
and Mobility action of its Sixth Framework Programme (EC Contract No. MRTN-CT-2006-035873). I am indebted
to my thesis supervisors Jason Abrevaya and Daniel Hamermesh.
1 Introduction
The assimilation of immigrants to natives in their host countries has been an active research field
since the publication of Chiswick’s (1978) paper on the “Americanization” of the earnings of
foreign-born men, but in the subsequent literature the conclusion that immigrants assimilate to
the native population has been questioned (see for example Borjas (1985), and for the case of
Germany Pischke (1992)). While the question of immigrant assimilation remains inconclusive, it
would hardly be a surprise to find a lasting gap between natives and immigrants even after long
durations of stay. Some human capital components (or prejudices) might never be fully attained
(or overcome), such as a full command of the language of the host country.
The prospects for 2nd generation immigrants, that is the children of those who immigrated to
the country of interest, should not be hampered by the “shock” that some of the human capital
accumulated earlier in life is lost or rendered useless and that new human capital specific to the
new environment needs to be acquired. This optimistic view (or hope) has not been met in many
European countries. A recent OECD (2009) study compares educational and labor market out-
comes of children of immigrants and finds that for the classical immigration countries Australia,
Canada, New Zealand and the United States “the children of migrants have education and labor
market outcomes that tend to be at least at par with those of the children of natives.” A very differ-
ent picture emerges for Austria, Germany and Belgium. Test scores from the OECD’s Programme
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for International Student Assessment (PISA) reveal that test score gaps between children whose
parents were born in Germany and native children of immigrants amount to the equivalent of about
at least two years of schooling. Part of the gap can be explained by the children’s socio-economic
background, notably the education of parents, but even after controlling for those factors a sub-
stantial and significant gap remains. The study confirms the results by Riphahn (2003) on the
educational attainment of 2nd generation immigrants in Germany. Riphahn finds that substantial
gaps in education relative to “autochthon” children exist and moreover that they do not seem to
shrink over cohorts. The children of immigrants from guest-worker nations, notably Turkey, the
former Yugoslavia, and Italy, are particularly disadvantaged.
Ethnic capital, introduced by Borjas (1992) could provide the missing explanation for the ap-
parently persistent gap (albeit not for the difference between the European and the classical immi-
gration countries). The idea put forward by Borjas is that the average human capital endowment
of a certain immigrant group exerts an externality on the human capital accumulation of a child
belonging to that group. In a follow-up paper Borjas (1995) specifies the transmission mechanism
of ethnic capital as neighborhoods and reports some evidence for the importance of this channel,
but relies on the assumption that ethnic capital is the same for all neighborhoods, calling it the
“skill-invariance” assumption.
In this paper I relax the skill-invariance assumption and study the effects of ethnic capital –
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measured as average years of schooling of an immigrant group within a region – on the educational
attainment of immigrants’ children. I then estimate the same model with ethnic capital measured
at more aggregated geographical units, namely at the state, and at the country level. The latter
corresponds to skill-invariance as in Borjas (1995).
The main findings of this paper are:
1. A higher average education of migrant households in the region has a positive effect on
schooling outcomes of their children, and the effect is amplified through the ethnic concen-
tration in the region.
2. Results are sensitive to the regional aggregation. Inference on ethnic capital results based on
national averages need to be interpreted with caution.
The idea of ethnic capital is taken up by Gang and Zimmermann (2000) in their study of
schooling attainment of children of immigrants who were born in Germany or arrived before the
age of 16. The authors find that migrants’ education has no effect on the educational attainment
of their children (contrary to natives’ education on their children) and that there is a positive group
size effect. However, the latter is measured as the number of immigrants belonging to the group
in Germany and must be considered a very crude measure. This, taken together with the limited
number of observations of immigrant children (ranging from 116 Greeks to 295 Turks) make the
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results unconvincing. A similar study for Denmark by Nielsen et al. (2001) echoes the finding
of no influence of parental education for whether 2nd generation immigrants finish a qualifying
education, whereas the opposite is found by Jakobsen and Smith (2003), possibly due to using a
different data set and using only mothers’ education. The concentration of 1st and 2nd generation
immigrants in the childhood municipality reduces the probability of finishing a qualifying educa-
tion, whereas ethnic capital - including the average years of education of 1st generation immigrants
of the relevant immigrant group - has no impact.
While I also consider the intergenerational transmission of human capital, I do so only to
purge the regressions from potential omitted variable bias. My actual focus is on the regional
composition of different ethnic groups and to what extent immigrants’ children’s exposure to their
reference group helps or inhibits their educational attainment. Thus, this paper is loosely related to
the abundant intergenerational human capital mobility literature, recent examples including Black
et al. (2005) or Bleakley and Chin (2008), and for the German case Heineck and Riphahn (2007)
or Casey and Dustmann (2005).
Of more importance is the link to the neighborhood or, more generally, the social capital lit-
erature, in particular studies of children’s outcomes. An early and influential paper in economics
is Case and Katz (1991), who find substantial neighborhood effects for disadvantaged youth in
Boston. Ginther et al. (2000) review some of the earlier literature and demonstrate the sensitivity
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of neighborhood effects on children’s outcomes (including high-school graduation) to the inclusion
of household variables. More recent studies finding significant effects of peers and neighborhoods
on children’s educational outcomes include Goux and Maurin (2006) and Rury (2004). Raaum
et al. (2006) find negligible, if any, neighborhood effects for Norway. Bobonis and Finan (2009)
provide evidence of peer effects on secondary school enrollment in Mexican villages using a ran-
domized controlled trial conducted to evaluate a policy intervention.
The distinction between ethnic capital, immigrants, and 2nd generation immigrants can be a
source of confusion. I introduce the following terminology: An immigrant is a person who was
born outside of Germany. Children of immigrants born in Germany I call 2nd generation im-
migrants or simply immigrants’ children. Somebody who is or was a non-German citizen OR
(non-exclusive) who is an immigrant is an ethnic and the average years of schooling of ethnics
older than 30 are used to form measures of ethnic capital. This is done separately for every re-
gion and every ethnic group. Every ethnic, and consequently every immigrant, belongs to a group,
defined by country of birth and/or initial citizenship. A native is somebody born in Germany and
holding German citizenship, but NOT through naturalization. With these definitions, 14% of the
West-German population are immigrants. 27% belong to a household with one immigrant parent
belonging to one of the groups considered in this paper.
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2 Theory
I follow the group membership and conformity literature in that I assume that children of immi-
grants identify with children of the same ethnic background, thus introducing the ethnic externality.
Predecessors of this line of work are Currarini et al. (2009), Akerlof (1997), and Akerlof and Kran-
ton (2002).2 Suppose that individuals choose their human capital h, and denote utility associated
with human capital U(h). This should be understood as the present value of all monetary and
non-monetary benefits of human capital. There are diminishing marginal returns to education. In
particular, let utility be given by a quadratic function of human capital3:
U = α0h− α12 h
2 α0 > 0,α1 > 0,h≤ α0α1
There are several costs to human capital investment. First, there is a direct cost, Cd(h,X ,ε), which
is increasing and convex in h, and which is allowed to vary along observable demographic variables
X and ability ε. There are also three different costs of deviation, reflecting the agent’s preference
for conformity: first, the agent wants to conform to his parents, second, to the children of native
Germans in his generation, and third, to the children of immigrants from the same country of
origin. Denote the human capital of the parents by hp, the average human capital of the children
2Alternatively, ethnic capital could enter as an externality into the production of human capital as in Borjas (1992),
yielding the same reduced form.
3A working paper version of this paper considers a general, non-parametric model and arrives at the same compar-
ative statics results.
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of native Germans by h¯n (the subscript standing for native) and the average human capital of the
children of immigrants to which the agent belongs by h¯r (the subscript standing for reference). Let
sr be the share of the reference group in the region’s population or the schooling cohort. Let the
non-conformity costs be given by quadratic functions:
Cp =
αp
2
(h−hp)2 αp > 0
Cn =
αn
2
(h− h¯n)2 + τn(1− sr)2 (h− h¯n)
2 αn ≥ 0,τn ≥ 0
Cr =
αr
2
(h− h¯r)2 +pisr + τrsr2 (h− h¯r)
2 αr ≥ 0,τr ≥ 0
Cd = (α2δX + ε)h
The marginal cost of acquiring human capital is decreasing in the human capital that the agent
is conforming to, or, put differently, the cross-derivatives of the cost-components are negative:
∂2Cp
∂h∂hp < 0,
∂2Cn
∂h∂h¯n
< 0, ∂
2Cr
∂h∂h¯r
< 0. The last argument in the native and reference group cost is the
share of the group in the region of interest. This allows for a stronger impact of ethnic capital
(and possibly weaker impact of natives’ capital) in regions with high concentrations of certain
immigrant groups. The ability distribution, parental human capital, the share of the ethnic group
sr, and the average human capital of non-migrant peers (children of natives) are exogenous, but the
average human capital of immigrant’s children of a certain group h¯r is determined in equilibrium
and needs to be the average of chosen levels of human capital, if the model is to be internally
consistent. The above formulation makes some assumptions for analytical convenience.
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First, ability enters only in the direct cost component. In principle ability could be part of any
or all of the cost and return components. None of them are directly observable, and thus where
exactly ability enters the human capital investment decision is not known to the researcher. He
can not identify the relative role of ability in, say, Cd from its role in Cp. The same holds for the
variables included in X . Second, the decision-maker in this model is the child, not the parent(s),
but of course the parents influence the decision through hp and possibly components of X .4
Third, the conformity assumption might seem arbitrary, and in some sense it is. One might as
well argue that agents want to be “special”. However, a model of distancing oneself from others
typically results in the overproduction of the good of interest (human capital) unless one indulges
in underperforming with respect to others (see Akerlof (1997) for a discussion). The conformity
assumption is in keeping with most of the peer-effect literature, examples including Falk and Ichino
(2006), and Bandiera et al. (2010) for effects in work-productivity, Lyle (2009), and Sacerdote
(2001) for college success, and among others Bobonis and Finan (2009) for secondary school
enrollment. The peer-effect literature relies on (quasi-) experimental designs which confines it to
4The model differs in this respect from Borjas (1992). Borjas models the parent’s decision as a trade-off between
investing in the child and own consumption. In this paper I am focusing on the secondary education (not college)
of teenagers in Germany. Thinking of schooling attainment of a teenager in a system with basically free education
as foregone consumption seems to be less justified than, for example, the choice for higher education in the United
States. Even for the latter case the role of credit constraints is called into question by Cameron and Heckman (2001).
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small and selected samples, so that the generality of its results might be questioned. Ultimately,
the empirical analysis will determine whether we are justified in believing in the dominance of a
conformity effect.
The problem of the agent is to maximize utility net of all costs over the choice of human capital:
max
h
U(h)−Cd−Cp−Cn−Cr
The corresponding first-order condition is:
h =−1
β
(
α0 +αphp +{τn(1− sr)+αn}h¯n +{τrsr +αr}h¯r−α2δX− ε
)
(1)
and β=−α1−αp−αn− τn(1− sr)−αr− τrsr.
Averaging h over all immigrants’ children of one immigrant group and solving for h¯r, we find:
h¯r =
−α0 +α2δX¯−αph¯p,r−{αn + τn(1− sr)}h¯n− ε¯
−α1−αp− τn(1− sr)−αn (2)
Equation (2) shows that the equilibrium in this model is unique, which is a feature of the
quadratic cost functions and consequently the linear first-order condition. Plugging (2) into (1)
and denoting γ=−α1−αp−αn− τn(1− sr) we can write h as:
h = −1
β
(
α0 +αphp +{αn + τn(1− sr)}h¯n + αr + τrsrγ (3)[−α0−αph¯p,r−{αn + τn(1− sr)}h¯n +α2δX¯ + ε¯]−α2δX− ε)
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One can verify that
dh/dhp > 0
dh/dh¯n > 0
dh/dh¯p,r > 0
∂2h
∂h¯p,r∂sr
> 0
but ∂
2h
∂h¯n∂sr
is ambiguous due to the following effect: Imagine an increase in h¯n. This exerts a positive
externality on h through the cost reduction in Cn – call this the primary externality. The positive
externality is dampened if there is an increase in sr, making the cost component Cn relatively
unimportant. An increase in the share sr decreases the positive effect of increasing h¯n directly.
However, the primary externality increases h¯r, and this exerts a secondary externality through Cr.
The second externality is amplified by an increase in sr.
2.1 Identification
Comparing equations (1) and (3) reveals the infamous reflection problem in Manski (1993). Sup-
pose we could estimate the term αr+τrsrβ in equation (1). Would we be able to interpret these
coefficients as evidence of peer-effects (what Manski calls endogenous effects)? Or are we mea-
suring the effect of average human capital of the parent generation and average demographics of
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the region, as would be suggested by (3) (exogenous effects)? Identification of these effects is pos-
sible under some circumstances. Brock and Durlauf (2001a), (2001b), and Durlauf (2004) discuss
models of social interactions and provide sufficient conditions for identification of endogenous
effects. The conditions are not innocuous however. The condition of unbounded support for the
regional variables will rarely be met (unless one is willing to omit bounded variables), and clearly
in this paper one of the key variables, sr, is bounded between zero and one. Lee (2007) proposes
identification through variation in the group sizes, a method which is taken up by Davezies et al.
(2009) and applied to test scores of school-children in Canada by Boucher et al. (2010). In this
paper I do not distinguish between endogenous and contextual effects. Identification would be
weak at best, and the focus of this study is (necessarily) the presence or absence of ethnic capital
effects, rather than through which channel they are operationalized.
The equations derived so far are not estimable, since human capital is not directly observed.
Rather, we see a categorical outcome for teenagers: whether they have dropped out of school, have
obtained a degree or attend a grammar school (Gymnasium), or have finished another secondary
school. Details on the schooling system are described in the data section. For now suffice it to say
that we can write the human capital model as a latent variable model. That is, we see the grammar
school outcome if and only if human capital is above some threshold. Then we have the probability
of attending grammar school:
P(G = 1) = P(h > ηg)
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I include a region-specific constant in X , so that without loss of generality I can set the average
ability ε¯ to zero. Substituting in h from equation (3) and rearranging, the probability can be written
approximately as:
P(G = 1) = P(a0+a1sr +a2hp+a3h¯p,r +a4srh¯p,r +a5X +a6X¯ +a7srX¯ +a8h¯n+a9srh¯n > ε) (4)
where the a are functions of the structural parameters α and τ, and I have already verified that
a2,a3,a4 and a8 are positive, and a9 could not be signed unambiguously. However, if externalities
of native peers are weakened by stronger ethnic concentrations, a9 should be negative. The region
of residence and the parent are exogenous for the child in a behavioral sense (the child doesn’t
choose either). Yet, statistical endogeneity is still present if ability of children and of parents
correlate (through hp and X) and parents sort into regions of similar average human capital (through
h¯p and X¯). Intergenerational transmission of ability, if present, possibly obeys a regression to the
mean, but evidence for its importance is given by Black et al. (2005).
‘Table 1 here.’
The bias from selection into regions is attenuated by the high correlations that concentrations
of different ethnic groups exhibit. Table 1 reports those correlations across regions. They range
from 0.80 between Russians and Arabs to 0.95 between Turks and Polish. If the choice of res-
idence depends on ability, it seems fair to assume and it is supported by the high correlation of
ethnic shares that the choice is similar for the different ethnic groups. Thus, I can compare two ob-
12
servations with the same (assumed) expected ability in the same region, but with different degrees
of exposure to the ethnic group, since the ethnic groups differ in their numbers for Germany as a
whole. To further deal with selection bias I use the information contained in observing a parent in
one region (and not another). I follow a non-parametric approach due to Dahl (2002), circumvent-
ing distributional assumptions on and the modeling of tastes for locations. The procedure is: in a
first step immigrants of a certain education are grouped together and to every immigrant I ascribe a
measure ρ, corresponding to the share of immigrants of this education being observed in the obser-
vation’s region. A polynomial of ρ is then included as a term in the main regression. The variable
ρ or a function of it can be regarded as a measure of how typical the immigrant is with respect to
its residence of choice.5 Suppose that from observable characteristics we would have expected an
immigrant to move to a region with a high share of other immigrants, but that he has not done so,
because his “ability” was high and he did not feel the need to live close to other immigrants. Then
ρ would be low, and some inverse function of it could be used as a proxy for his ability.
5I thank Simone Bertoli for suggesting this method. A parametric version of the same method has been developed
by Lee (1983), which is itself a generalization of the Heckman selection correction to multiple first stages.
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3 Secondary education in Germany
The sixteen states of Germany enjoy a high degree of autonomy in the design of their schooling
systems. Primary education runs from first to fourth grade in all states except for Berlin and Bran-
denburg, where children finish primary school after sixth grade. Traditionally secondary education
has been divided into three kinds of schools, which is in stark contrast to the high-school system
in the USA. The Hauptschule was designed to prepare students for a manual profession and grad-
uation is after 9th grade. The Realschule lasts one year longer and is supposed to prepare students
for administrative and lower white-collar jobs. The Gymnasium is the most prestigious of the tra-
ditional schooling forms and is the only one which runs through grades 11, 12, and 13, these being
called Oberstufe and preparing students for higher education. The Gymnasium is now undergoing
substantial reforms, including cutting the 13th grade. While this is already the case for some states
of East Germany, only the state of “Saarland” in West Germany had made the transition to cutting
the last year by 2009. In 2006 all West-German states were still under the 13th grade regime. The
Gymnasium finishes with a graduation exam, the Abitur, the completion of which is a sufficient
(but not necessary) condition to apply for and attend a university. While other paths to higher edu-
cation are possible, the Abitur is still the most common one. Mixed school types exist, but even in
those the grades 11 through 13 are considered part of the Gymnasium. The conditions for attend-
ing the Gymnasium differ across states. Some states are more selective in admitting children to
14
the Gymnasium than others and in most states parents can decide to send their children to a school
against the recommendation of school teachers. In the empirical analysis this will be accounted
for by the inclusion of state- (or region-) fixed effects, which in the latent variable is equivalent to
state-specific threshold values ηg.
4 Data
All estimations are performed on the 2006 cross-section of the German Microcensus, an annual
representative household survey of 1% of the German population. I have excluded East Germany
(except for Berlin) from the analysis, because of the virtual absence of a history of migration to
East Germany. The relevant population are household members below the age of 20, living with
at least one immigrant parent or guardian and who fall into one of three categories: 1) They attend
the Oberstufe of a Gymnasium (grades 11, 12, or 13), or they have graduated from a Gymnasium,
2) They do not belong to the first category, but have obtained another schooling diploma (such as
Real- or Hauptschule, and possibly had some vocational training), 3) They are not in school, but
also have no schooling degree (drop-outs). These are the three possible outcomes of all regressions.
Some observations reported having obtained a secondary degree, but not from which school, so
that I excluded them. Since graduation from a Gymnasium typically occurs at the age of 19 and
is often followed by attending college and a related relocation, sample selection is a potential
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problem. I find that 86% of all non-married observations of age 19 still live with at least one
parent, compared to 93% of all 18-year-olds. For ethnics the numbers are not different from the
overall population, so that sample selection affects some 7-15% of the relevant population. 13%
(11%) of those 19-year old ethnics who live without parents, and 29% (7%) of those who live
with a parent attend or graduated from Gymnasium (are school-dropouts), so that teenagers with
a high educational attainment are over-represented in the sample. Unfortunately, I do not observe
the residence of those who live without parents before they moved out of their parents’ household,
nor can I determine whether they are children of immigrants. If those who have left their parents’
household have stayed in the same region (or moved to regions with similar regional characteristics
as their parents’ home) sample selection should not be a problem. The estimates will be biased
only if those who obtained a higher degree have moved to regions with different characteristics
compared to those with lower degrees.
4.1 Ethnic groups and their education
I classify ethnics and immigrants as Yugoslavian (Serbia/Montenegro, Croatia, Bosnia-Hercegovina,
Slovenia, Former Yugoslavia), Russian (previous Soviet Republics), Polish, Turkish, Italian, and
Arabs (North African country, Iraq). The classification can be criticized since the groups exhibit
high degrees of heterogeneity (the different ethnicities and history of the former Yugoslavia being
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the most obvious example), but members of a group share a common language. Except for Arabs,
these groups above are the most numerous ones in Germany. Yugoslavia, Turkey, and Italy are
the countries which sent most immigrants in the framework of the guest-worker recruitment in the
sixties and early seventies. Immigrants from the former Soviet-Union and from Poland are mainly
immigrants who could claim German descent, giving them the right to obtain German citizenship.
Arabs are the least numerous group and are included because the public discourse on 2nd genera-
tion immigrants has often focused on Turkish and Arab youth. Since their numbers are too small
in some regions to base ethnic capital variables on, I have run all regressions with and without
Arab children, and obtained comparable results. Every immigrant belongs to one of the immigrant
groups only. I drop households in which the two parents belong to different immigrant groups. The
household is then assigned to one of the groups if one of the parents belongs to it. For example,
Turkish-German and Turkish-Turkish households are categorized as Turkish,6 but Turkish-Polish
households are excluded. The final sample consists of children who fall into one of the three edu-
cational categories noted above and who live with at least one immigrant parent belonging to one
of the ethnic groups.
The human capital of a parent is approximated by assigning the German equivalent years of
schooling to ISCED classifications of his/her education, where I use a conversion table from OECD
(2004, page 308). Ethnic capital h¯p,r for group j in region r is the average years of schooling of
6Dummies for mixed households are included in all regressions.
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ethnics of origin j above the age of 30 in region r.
I use several individual and household (the variables in X) and regional variables as controls
in all regressions.7 The income variable in the Microcensus is only categorical (with 24 cate-
gories), so that I approximate income with the average of the bounds of the category into which
the observation falls.
4.2 Regional aggregation
The Microcensus allows the division of West-Germany including Berlin into 104 regions, with
on average 5,300 observations per region. Thus, the average population of the regions amounts
to 500,000. Every region is either one of the major cities with populations 500,000 or above, or
medium to small size cities with the surrounding counties. Given that our interest lies in children
between ages 15 and 19, these regions are too big. It seems natural to assume that teenagers would
want to conform to peers and role models that are visible for them, and their day-to-day contacts
will take place within city and school districts. A smaller regional unit would be desirable, but is
not available. On the other hand, it is well-known that ethnic and social segregation within cities
7In particular parents’ income, employment status, household size, sex, age indicators, ethnic dummies, years since
and age at migration for both parents, the share of immigrants in the ethnic group, and the share of German citizens in
the ethnic group.
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is not as pronounced in Germany as it is in the United States (see Musterd (2005)), so that the bias
from aggregation might not be too severe. To the extent that it is present, the bias works against the
hypothesis of the presence of ethnic capital externalities (estimates will be biased towards zero),
because, if the predictions hold, teenagers with less educational success will be assigned higher
than “true” ethnic capital and vice versa.
For all regions I compute the shares of natives’ children falling into one of the three school
categories, thereby proxying for h¯n. I use all observations older than thirty to compute the average
years of schooling of ethnics (for every group) to proxy h¯p,r, and to compute the shares of the
ethnic groups in the population of the region, sr.
Since the regional variables are constructed as averages and shares of a 1% sample, they will
be measured with error. The median of observations in a region is 4,587, the mean is 5,319. Mea-
surement error is thus greater for smaller regions and smaller immigrant groups. As a robustness
check I run the regressions excluding observations for whom ethnic capital is based on less than 20
observations. For the estimates that correct for the endogeneity of the regions I form four groups
of ethnics, ordered by their years of schooling. For every region I compute the share of ethnics
in one educational group being observed in that region. This share is denoted by ρ. A quadratic
polynomial is then included in the main regressions.
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4.3 Descriptive Statistics
Summary statistics are presented in tables 2, 3, 4, and 5. Table 2 summarizes the educational
and other variables of ethnics older than 30. Those observations are used to form the regional
variables. Some differences are striking, such as the much lower average years of education of
Turks, but also of Arabs, Italians, and Yugoslavs, compared to “Germans” (here including all
omitted ethnic groups) and other ethnic groups. Polish ethnics seem to have the most favorable
educational background. We also see that the average exposure to one’s own ethnic group differs
considerably for the immigrant groups. Average concentrations range from less than one percent
(for Arabs) to almost 4%. There is considerable variation of concentrations across regions. For
example, the standard deviation of the share variable is 1.9 for Turkish, and 0.6 for Arab ethnics.
The second table summarizes ethnic capital for immigrants proper and mainly echoes the numbers
for ethnics. The high share of ethnic Germans among immigrants from Poland and Russia is
reflected by the high share of German citizens among them, since German citizenship was granted
unconditionally to immigrants of German descent. The inclusion of immigrant groups which are
different along the dimensions of educational background, time and purpose of migration, and
linguistic and cultural distance is problematic, but important for identifying the role of regional
variables in shaping educational outcomes for immigrants’ children. It enables me to compare
immigrants’ children of different groups (with differing exposure to the own immigrant group)
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within and immigrant children of the same group between regions. I account for the observable
differences of the immigrants by controlling for ethnic- and region-fixed effects and for variables
such as age at and years since migration.
‘Table 2 here.’
‘Table 3 here.’
Table 4 reports means and standard deviations of ethnic capital for the sample. Importantly,
we see that one standard deviation of ethnic capital amounts to one year of schooling, pointing to
a good degree of regional differences in ethnic capital even within ethnic groups. Table 5 shows
differences in schooling outcomes for 19-year olds: 46% of natives’ children attend or attended
Gymnasium, and only 2% of them don’t obtain a schooling degree. Only children of Polish immi-
grants attain a comparable education, while the children of all other groups lack behind to different
degrees. An interesting observation in the data (not reported) is that a much higher fraction of
immigrants’ children start Gymasium, but do not graduate. To account for this phenomenon I have
included a dummy for ages 18 and 19 in the regressions.
‘Table 4 here.’
‘Table 5 here.’
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5 Results
I estimate two models. The first is OLS on a reduced form of equation (3), the second is an or-
dered probit model on equation (4), where the outcome for the OLS model is a binary variable (1
for attending Gymnasium, 0 otherwise), and the outcomes for the ordered probit are 2 for Gym-
nasium, 1 for graduate of any other school, and 0 for school drop-out. The OLS results are easy
to interpret. In particular, the coefficients on the share-interaction terms are marginal effects of
ethnic concentrations on ethnic capital externalities. The ordered probit model makes more use
of the information on education by including drop-outs as a distinct outcome. All regressions are
performed on immigrants’ children younger than 20.
5.1 Linear Probability Model
‘Table 6 here.’
OLS coefficients for household and individual variables are reported in table 6. The first col-
umn reports results for natives’ children, column two for immigrants’ children and the third adds
regional fixed-effects. Results are reported only for educational and significant variables. Two
things to note from this table are the significant effect of parental education (contrary to the earlier
finding of Gang and Zimmermann (2000)), and the robustness of household characteristics to the
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inclusion of regional fixed effects. Most signs are as expected, in particular the positive effects of
income and household space per household member. Women are more likely to attend Gymnasium
and the role of the adult variable has been discussed earlier. The positive effect of young house-
hold members and the negative effect of total household members is puzzling, but the net effect is
negative, possibly due to fewer available resources for each household member. It is noteworthy
that age at and years since migration has no significant effect for either parent, and neither does a
dummy for German-Ethnic mixed households.8
‘Table 7 here.’
Table 7 reports results from the same regressions for the regional variables. The first column
reports results for natives, column 2 for immigrants but omitting the share interactions, the third
column adds the interactions with immigrant shares, and the fourth column includes regional fixed
effects. D1 is the share (between 0 and 1) of natives’ children attending or recently graduated from
Gymnasium and D2 is the share of natives’ children with another secondary education degree.
Educr is ethnic capital: the average years of schooling of the relevant ethnic group in the region.
The coefficient on D1 suggests some positive - albeit weak - externality of other children’s school-
ing. However, one must be cautious in interpreting this quantity because of the reflection problem.
A one percentage point increase in Gymnasium attendance in the region and a corresponding drop
8To save space and focus on the ethnic capital variables I do not report household results for the remainder of this
chapter. Suffice it to say that they survive all the following specifications. All results can be requested from the author.
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in the drop-out rate increase the likelihood of an individual attending Gymnasium by six tenths of
a percentage point. For immigrants’ children we can compare observations of different ethnicities,
so that their ethnic capital variables will differ within a region. Without allowing for share inter-
actions, ethnic capital has a positive impact on the probability of an immigrant’s child to attend
Gymnasium. If the average schooling of ethnics could be increased by an additional year, the prob-
ability of attending Gymnasium for an immigrant’s child would increase by two percentage points.
The third and fourth columns demonstrate that this positive externality is sensitive to the share
of ethnics in the region. The interaction term for Educr and ethnic concentration is significantly
positive even after inclusion of region fixed effects, while the level effect of ethnic capital becomes
essentially zero. The coefficient of Educr and the interaction term are jointly significant at the 1%
level for the model in column (3) and at the 10% level for the model in column (4). Immigrants’
children benefit from high ethnic capital more if the concentration of their ethnic group is higher.
This confirms the comparative statics result in the model section. Note also that the coefficients on
interactions between share and D1 and D2 are negative, but not significantly so. For immigrants’
children, D1 and D2 are collinear with region fixed effects, so that the interaction coefficient might
be capturing an effect on general regional characteristics.
‘Table 8 here.’
Next, I repeated the same estimations, but basing ethnic capital on state-wide averages, re-
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ducing the number of regions from 104 to 11, and on national averages, effectively imposing the
skill-invariance assumption from Borjas (1995). The latter can not control for ethnic capital and
ethnic fixed effects separately because of collinearity. Ethnic concentrations are still based on the
104 regions. Table 8 shows the main result: State-wide and national aggregation masks the effect
of the ethnic capital. In particular, the coefficients on the interaction terms are essentially zero,
and the independent concentration effect is negative. At least in this application, assuming skill-
invariance changes results critically and might mistakenly lead one to conclude that ethnic capital
does not matter, and that ethnic concentrations have an independent, negative effect on schooling
outcomes.
‘Table 9 here.’
Next, I run the same regressions on certain sub-samples. Table 9 reports results for boys, girls,
for observations aged 18 or 19, and for observations for which ethnic capital is based on at least
20 observations in the region. The interaction effect is not present for boys, and seems absent for
older observations, suggesting that ethnic capital might play a role for enrolling in Gymnasium, but
not necessarily for graduation. The interaction effect is present for girls, and when observations
with few ethnics in the region are excluded. What explains the differences between boys and girls?
One explanation that one might put forth is that boys are more likely to find employment through
parents’ networks. If they anticipate this, their education might be more strongly determined by
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this than by ethnic capital. I have checked the German Socio-Economic Panel for the years 1995 to
2006 to compare the job-finding mechanisms between men and women whose parents immigrated
to Germany. While men who found employment reported more frequently having found the job
through referrals of a parent or friends, the difference between men and women (26% vs. 22%)
was not significantly different from zero.
‘Table 10 here.’
‘Table 11 here.’
5.2 Ordered Probit Model
As stated earlier, the ordered probit model exploits more information on children’s educational
attainment by adding school drop-out as another outcome category. Results from this model are
reported in table 10. The first column does not include the share interactions, and the results sug-
gest insignificance of ethnic capital. The second includes all interaction terms, and we see the
familiar result that positive effects of high levels of ethnic capital are mainly mediated by the ex-
posure to the ethnic group. The third column adds the selection correction regressor ρ and its
square. Inclusion of these variables does not alter the main results. Indeed, a likelihood ratio test
for the inclusion of ρ and ρ2 does not reject the hypothesis of their insignificance. The choice of
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region by parent seems to contain little – if any – information on unobserved characteristics of the
child. Interaction terms in nonlinear models are not marginal effects, i.e. the coefficient on the
interaction term is not ∂
2P(Gymnasium)
∂Educ∂share . Moreover the marginal effect and its standard error will be
different for every data point (see Ai and Norton (2003) for a discussion of this). I thus calculated
the marginal effect at different shares for a typical observation by setting all characteristics to the
sample average, and Educr to 10.5. I did this for the model where Educr is based on regional and
on state aggregates separately. The results are reported in table 11. We see again that state aggre-
gates fail to detect the marginal effect of ethnic concentration on the ethnic externality. We also
see that this effect loses precision as the ethnic concentration increases. Compare these numbers
to figure 1, which plots the marginal effect of ethnic capital on the probability of attending Gym-
nasium (y-axis) along ethnic concentration (x-axis), with ethnic capital defined on regions, states,
and the country respectively. Every point is one observation in the sample. The effect of ethnic
concentration is visibly positive in the first case only (upper left). With state-wide ethnic capital
(upper right), one might still guess that an effect is present, but it is smaller in magnitude and has
a higher variance for every ethnic concentration. Finally, the third figure (lower left) shows only a
cloud.
‘Figure 1 here.’
27
6 Conclusion
The main variables of interest are the regional variables, particularly those associated with ethnic
capital. For children of natives there is some correlation between attending Gymnasium and be-
tween the average attainment of other children. For immigrants’ children I find significant effects
of ethnic capital. Importantly, ethnic capital externalities are reinforced through ethnic concentra-
tions: The externality is stronger the higher the share of ethnics in a region is. In other words,
ethnic capital plays a stronger role if it is more “visible”. Adding a variable that accounts for the
choice of region does not alter the results, but measuring ethnic capital at high regional aggregates
such as states or the whole country fails to detect this role of ethnic concentrations.
Ethnic capital as transmitted through immigrant shares and educational attainment in the re-
gions has a significant influence on the educational attainment of 2nd generation immigrants. Some
care has to be taken in interpreting this result. First, one has to consider that we have measured
a continuous variable (human capital) by only three categories, not being able to exploit varia-
tions within the categories. Second, as described in the section on Germany’s secondary education
system, the separation of children to Gymnasium and other schools happens at a very young age,
and few school switches (to or from the Gymnasium) occur after this initial assignment.9 Often
9According to the Bildungsbericht 2008, a report on education in Germany published by the state ministries of
education and the federal ministry of education and research, 3% of children in grades 7-9 switched school types in
28
the argument is made that the system is cementing educational careers early on, with little room
for up- or downward mobility. At the age of ten or eleven, household characteristics are probably
much stronger determinants than other “environmental” factors. Third, one would expect ethnic
capital to operate on micro-levels such as schools, or even classes, the workplace, and neighbor-
hoods, which relates also to the first point: We observe people in the Gymnasium, but can not
say anything on how those influence each other (the within dimension of a category). The spatial
comprehensiveness of the data set comes at the cost that such micro-layers can not be identified.
Seen in this light, the statistical presence of educational externalities is remarkable in its own
right. Yet, many aspects of the effect remain in the dark. Is the effect an expression of peer-
effects, or is it an exogenous/contextual effect, in the sense of Manski (1993)? At what age does
it start to influence human capital investment decisions? Answering these questions would dissect
the somewhat unsatisfying black-box concept of ethnic capital, but will require more information
(and of a different kind) on environmental contexts people at a crucial age for their human capital
investments find themselves in.
2006/2007.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Regional correlations of ethnic shares
Yugo Russ Pole Turk Ital Arab Pop density
Yugo 1.00
Russ 0.86 1.00
Pole 0.93 0.85 1.00
Turk 0.93 0.80 0.95 1.00
Ital 0.91 0.83 0.89 0.89 1.00
Arab 0.89 0.80 0.87 0.87 0.81 1.00
Pop 0.21 0.19 0.21 0.19 0.19 0.16 1.00
density 0.33 0.20 0.34 0.38 0.24 0.43 0.20 1.00
Correlations for 104 regions of West-Germany, including Berlin. Source: Microcensus 2006.
Table 2: Summary statistics, Ethnic groups age>30
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Natives Yugo Russ Pole Turk Ital Arab
educ (mean) 12.4 10.8 11.8 12.4 8.8 10.4 10.2
citizen (%) 97 17 77 77 26 11 44
bornhere (%) 89 6 2 2 8 17 3
share (mean) n.a. 2.0 2.5 1.6 3.8 1.4 0.8
age (mean) 55.7 49.5 50.6 49.4 45.9 49.2 44.9
observations 371,529 4,428 6,544 4,260 9,546 2,992 1,147
citizen: German citizen. bornhere: Born in Germany. Source: Microcensus 2006.
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Table 3: Summary statistics, Immigrants
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Yugo Russ Pole Turk Ital Arab
educ (mean) 10.8 11.2 11.7 9.7 10.5 10.4
citizen (%) 35 73 69 38 30 45
age (mean) 46.6 43.4 46.3 45.3 48.3 41.2
observations 8,154 12,574 8,349 15,306 4,890 2,908
Source: Microcensus 2006.
Table 4: Ethnic capital in sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Yugo Russ Pole Turk Ital
Educ (mean) 10.7 11.8 12.4 8.8 10.8
(1.1) (1.1) (0.7) (0.9) (1.8)
observations 675 1,210 691 1,684 464
Source: Microcensus 2006. Standard deviations in parentheses. Arabs not reported because of small sample size.
Table 5: Schooling outcomes, 19-year olds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Native Yugo Russ Pole Turk Ital
Gymnasium (%) 46 39 35 47 38 42
Other school (%) 52 56 62 49 56 53
Drop-outs (%) 2 4 3 4 6 5
observations 3,290 322 465 279 630 189
Source: Microcensus 2006. Numbers for natives are from the 70% scientific use file.
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Table 6: Determinants of attending Gymnasium, Linear Probability Model
(1) (2) (3)
Natives Migrants Migrants
educ parent 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.01***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
income/1,000 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04***
(0.002) (0.005) (0.005)
# hh members -0.02*** -0.05*** -0.05***
(0.007) (0.01) (0.01)
# young hh members 0.01* 0.03** 0.02*
(0.008) (0.01) (0.01)
hh space/10 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
male -0.12*** -0.09*** -0.09***
(0.009) (0.02) (0.02)
adult -0.08*** -0.11*** -0.11***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
state fixed effects yes yes no
region fixed effects no no yes
Observations 10,759 3,664 3,664
R-squared 0.11 0.13 0.15
Dependent variable: Binary variable of attending or having completed Gymnasium. educ parent is mother’s education
and father’s education if mother is not in the household. Other controls: Ethnic fixed effects, mixed Ethnic- German
household, father (mother) immigrant, age at migration father (mother), years since migration father (mother),
single-parent household, all parents unemployed. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. Source: Microcensus 2006.
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Table 7: Determinants Gymnasium, LPM, Ethnic Capital
Natives Migrants
(1) (2) (3) (4)
D1 0.59* 0.90 1.32
(0.32) (0.64) (1.1)
D1*share -0.19 -0.65
(0.37) (0.47)
D2 0.23 0.53 1.04
(0.33) (0.66) (1.1)
D2*share -0.22 -0.68
(0.36) (0.46)
Educr 0.02** 0.006 0.002
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Educr*share 0.01** 0.01**
(0.004) (0.005)
share -0.01 0.09 0.53
(0.01) (0.35) (0.45)
state fixed effects yes yes yes no
region fixed effects no no no yes
Observations 10,759 3,664 3,664 3,664
R-squared 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.15
Dependent variable: Binary variable of attending or having completed Gymnasium. D1: Share of natives’ children in
Gymnasium, D2: Share of natives’ children with secondary education other than Gymnasium, omitted category:
school dropouts, Educr: Average years of education of reference group. Other controls: see table 6. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Source: Microcensus 2006.
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Table 8: Determinants Gymnasium, LPM, Different Aggregates
Region State Country
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Educr 0.016 0.004 0.023 0.020 -0.01 -0.01
(0.011) 0.012 (0.023) (0.025) (0.01) (0.01)
Educr*share 0.009* 0.002 -0.0
(0.005) (0.005) (0.01)
share -0.01 -0.1** -0.02* -0.03 -0.02** -0.01
(0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (0.05)
Observations 3,664 3,664 4.041 4,041 4,060 4,060
R-squared 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.13
Dependent variable: Binary variable of attending or having completed Gymnasium. Educr: Average years of
education of reference group. Regressions control for region fixed effects. Regressions control for ethnic effects for
the “Region” and “State” aggregates. Other controls: see table 6. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. Source: Microcensus 2006.
Table 9: Determinants Gymnasium, LPM, Robustness
Boys Girls Age≥18 N≥20
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Educr 0.02 -0.02 -0.001 0.003
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Educr*share 0.001 0.02** 0.005 0.01*
(0.007) (0.01) (0.007) (0.006)
share 0.59 0.82 0.46 1.04
(0.62) (0.68) (0.59) (0.50)
Observations 1,936 1,728 2,162 3,387
R-squared 0.18 0.17 0.14 0.16
Dependent variable: Binary variable of attending or having completed Gymnasium. Educr: Average years of
education of reference group. Regressions control for regional fixed effects. Other controls: see table 6. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Source: Microcensus 2006.
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Table 10: Determinants Gymnasium, Ordinal Probit
(1) (2) (3)
Educr 0.04 0.01 0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.42)
Educr*share 0.02* 0.02*
(0.01) (0.01)
Share -0.04 -0.26** -0.26**
(0.02) (0.13) (0.13)
ρ,ρ2, no no yes
Observations 3,664 3,664 3,664
LL-value -2,845 -2,843 -2,842
Dependent variable: Ordinal schooling outcome. Educr: Average years of education of reference group. Regressions
control for regional fixed effects. Other controls: see table 6. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. Source: Microcensus 2006.
Table 11: Determinants Gymnasium, Ordinal Probit, Marginal Effect of Ethnic Capital
Regions States
(1) (2)
share=0.1 0.0091 0.0015
(1.82) (0.22)
share=1.2 0.0091 0.0015
(1.83) (0.20)
share=2.2 0.0090 0.0014
(1.77) (0.17)
share=5.2 0.0089 0.0012
(1.43) (0.13)
share=8.2 0.0087 0.0009
(1.09) (0.09)
Observations 3,664 4,041
Dependent variable: Ordinal schooling outcome. Regressions control for regional fixed effects. Other controls: see
table 6. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. t-statistics in parentheses are obtained with Delta method at sample means
for all variables except share. Source: Microcensus 2006.
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Figure 1: Marginal effect of ethnic capital, different aggregates
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